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LECTURE AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE

MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA

11 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENTED BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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**INTRODUCTION**

**1. ACKNOWLEDGE INTRODUCTION OR INTRODUCTOR  
REMARKS.**

**22 MAKE SOME REFERENCE TO OLD 9TH AIR  
FORCE PERSONNEL PRESENT.**

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LAST MONDAY MORNING YOU WERE ADDRESSED BY MR.- EDDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE. I KNOW OF NO ONE WHO COULD BETTER EXPLAIN TO YOU THE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

YOU HAVE JUST HEARD ADMIRAL INGLIS DISCUSS THE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AND THIS AFTERNOON GENERAL CHAMBERLIN WILL COVER THE SAME SUBJECT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT. THESE THREE OFFICERS (MR.- EDDY, ADMIRAL INGLIS, AND GENERAL CHAMBERLIN), TOGETHER WITH GENERAL McDONALD AS HEAD OF A-2, FORM THE BASIC MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD WHICH, BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER, IS DESIGNED TO ADVISE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

I FEEL IT IS VERY FORTUNATE THAT THE HEADS OF THESE MAJOR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COULD ALL APPEAR BEFORE YOU AT ONE TIME. I HOPE IT WILL VITALIZE YOUR INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM. I KNOW IT WILL CLARIFY MY EXPLANATION OF THE ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

SECRETARY OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE HAS A HISTORY. WE MIGHT SAY IT HAS A LURID PAST. CERTAINLY IT HAS POSSIBILITIES FOR A BRILLIANT FUTURE. THE REAL REQUIREMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE ARE SIMPLY WORDED IN A PAMPHLET ON THE ART OF WAR AS FOLLOWS:

**SYRIE**

"WHAT ENABLES THE WISE SOVEREIGN AND THE GOOD GENERAL TO STRIKE AND CONQUER, AND ACHIEVE THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF ORDINARY MEN IS FOREKNOWLEDGE."

**UNSYRIE**

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE IN 500 B. C. BY THE CHINESE LEADER SUN TZU.

ONE OF THE GREATEST THINGS THAT HAS COME OUT OF THE LATE WAR HAS BEEN THE TREMENDOUS GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND THE AWARENESS OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ITS EXISTENCE. BEFORE THE WAR, AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE WAS A STAFF FUNCTION RELEGATED, UNFORTUNATELY, TO AN ALL TOO SMALL A POSITION IN THE ARMED FORCES. CAREER INTELLIGENCE

OFFICERS WERE ALMOST NONEXISTENT. DURING THE WAR THERE WAS DEVELOPED, VIRTUALLY FROM SCRATCH, VARIOUS TECHNIQUES OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. THESE INCLUDED COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE, TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE, RADIO INTELLIGENCE, AND PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION, TO MENTION BUT A FEW. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT SO FAR AT LEAST AS THE AIR FORCES WERE CONCERNED, IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER WE WERE DEPENDENT INITIALLY ALMOST ENTIRELY UPON THE BRITISH. THEIR SUPERB INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM CAME TO OUR ASSISTANCE AT EVERY TURN, AND HELPED US TO DEVELOP AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TO THE HIGH POINT OF EFFICIENCY WHICH IT WAS REACHING WHEN THE WAR ENDED. TO ME, AND I HOPE TO ALL OF YOU, IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE SHOULD EVER SINK TO ITS PRE-WAR LEVEL AGAIN. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU VERY SERIOUSLY.

IN ADDITION TO THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE I TOUCHED UPON ABOVE, WE HAD THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES--O. S. S.--UNDER GENERAL DONOVAN. THIS OFFICE, OF COURSE, WAS INVALUABLE IN WAR TIME. IT PROVIDED BOTH

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL MISSIONS, AS WELL AS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS. IT WAS ABLE ON THE ONE HAND TO TURN OUT SUCH VAST RESEARCH AS THEIR PRE-INVASTION STUDY OF THE RAILROADS OF NORTH AFRICA, AND ON THE OTHER TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS AS THE ASSISTANCE WHICH THEY GAVE TO THE MAQUIS IN FRANCE AND TO THE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS IN SIAM. HOWEVER, IT CAN BE SAID OF O. S. S., AS OF VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, THAT IT WAS BORN OF AN EMERGENCY. MUCH WAS TRIAL AND ERROR. MANY OF THE MISTAKES MADE BY THE O. S. S. CAN BE LAID TO THE NECESSITY FOR BUILDING--IN A YEAR'S TIME--WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS. WITH THE END OF THE WAR MUCH OF THE TRAINED PERSONNEL, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, HAVE BEEN DEMOBILIZED OR TRANSFERRED TO OTHER ASSIGNMENTS. IN THE APPROPRIATE FIELDS, HOWEVER, WE PLAN TO FURTHER DEVELOP MUCH THAT WAS GOOD IN OUR WAR-TIME INTELLIGENCE AND PUT IT ON A PERMANENT BASIS, SO THAT WE WILL NEVER BE CAUGHT SO SHORT AGAIN.

IN CONTRAST TO THE APATHY IN INTELLIGENCE  
BEFORE THE WAR, ONE HEARS TODAY FROM MANY

QUARTERS THAT "INTELLIGENCE IS OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE," BUT WITH THE REPETITION OF THAT PHRASE ONE IS APT TO BE LULLED INTO FALSE SECURITY, FOR TO MAKE INTELLIGENCE OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE REQUIRES MORE THAN THE MERE MOUTHING OF THE PHRASE. IT REQUIRES THE TYPE OF ACTION WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. I SHOULD BE THE FIRST ONE TO DENY THAT INTELLIGENCE SHOULD BE OUR SOLE AND ONLY FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. WE MUST LEAD THE FIELD IN THE STRENGTH AND CAPACITY OF OUR PRODUCTION. WE MUST STRIVE TO STAY AHEAD OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. HOWEVER, AS WE BUILD THAT FIRST LINE TODAY, I WILL SAY THAT INTELLIGENCE MUST BE ONE OF ITS KEYSTONES, AND I PLEDGE YOU THAT, WITH THE HELP OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCES, AND STATE DEPARTMENT, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WILL AGGRESSIVELY ENDEAVOR TO BUILD THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD.

I THINK WE CAN BUILD SUCH AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE I FEEL WE HAVE THE BACKING OF THE PEOPLE. THEY ARE INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUS.

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IN THE PAST MONTHS I HAVE TALKED TO MANY OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND MANY OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AT EVERY HAND THEY HAVE PLEDGED THEIR INTEREST AND THEIR SUPPORT.

PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MAKING PEOPLE INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUS WAS THE DISASTER AT PEARL HARBOR. THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION BY THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE BROUGHT FORTH SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH FORM THE BASIS FOR SOME OF OUR PLANNING. THE COMMITTEE SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK REQUIRES CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND CLEAR-CUT ALLOCATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY. WITH THAT I AGREE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD SELECT OFFICERS FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK WHO POSSESS THE BACKGROUND AND CAPACITY FOR SUCH WORK; THAT THEY SHOULD RETAIN THESE OFFICERS ON INTELLIGENCE DUTY FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME; THAT THEY SHOULD INSURE THAT OFFICERS WITH AN APTITUDE FOR INTELLIGENCE RECEIVE SUCH ASSIGNMENTS AND DO NOT HAVE THEIR PROGRESS IMPEDED OR THEIR PROMOTIONS AFFECTED. WITH ALL THAT I AM IN HEARTY AGREEMENT. THE DAY SHOULD BE LONG SINCE PAST WHEN INTELLIGENCE WORK SHOULD BE

SOMETHING AN OFFICER DREADED FOR FEAR OF IMPEDING HIS PROGRESS. IT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE CONSIDERED AS MERELY A T/O VACANCY. IT SHOULD NEVER BE A PLACE TO SHELVES AN OFFICER.

HAVING DISCUSSED THESE FEW GENERAL POINTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY TIME TO A DISCUSSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP, ITS ORGANIZATION, SOME OF THE OPERATIONS WE ARE TRYING TO CONDUCT, AND TO DISCUSS QUITE FRANKLY WITH YOU SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE ARE FACING.

THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE LATE PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, STRESSED OF COURSE BY THE PEARL HARBOR EPISODE. HE DIRECTED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO STUDY THE PROBLEM AND RECOMMEND A SOLUTION. THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WAS REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR, AND NAVY. AS A RESULT OF THEIR CONSULTATIONS, A PROGRAM WAS EVOLVED WHICH WAS ACTIVATED BY AN EXECUTIVE LETTER FROM MR. TRUMAN ON 22 JANUARY OF THIS YEAR.

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THIS EXECUTIVE LETTER DESIGNATES THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR, AND NAVY TOGETHER WITH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT--IN THIS INSTANCE HIS DISTINGUISHED CHIEF OF STAFF, FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY--AS THE VOTING MEMBERS OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. A FIFTH MEMBER, WITHOUT VOTE, IS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS DIRECTED TO PLAN, DEVELOP, AND COORDINATE ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SO AS TO ASSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION RELATED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ALSO PROVIDED FOR A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--THAT IS, HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP--WAS REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY E. SOUERS, A FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. ADMIRAL SOUERS HAS NOW RETURNED TO CIVILIAN LIFE AND I NOW OCCUPY THE POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

IN MY CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I AM CHARGED WITH THE FOLLOWING BASIC FUNCTIONS:

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1. THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OF CERTAIN TYPES --ALTHOUGH NOT INTERFERING WITH THE NORMAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OR THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN INFORMATION COLLECTED, IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

3. THE DISSEMINATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.

4. THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN TO THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AS CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY.

5. PLANNING FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SO AS TO SECURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION.

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6. THE MONITORING OF ALL FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION.

THESE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE IN A CONTINUAL PROCESS OF REDEFINITION AND CLARIFICATION. AS WE PROGRESS AND DETERMINE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES THE DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITIES OF C. I. G. WILL BE AGGRESSIVELY EXECUTED TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES.

IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS PRESCRIBED FUNCTIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST KEEP IN CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. TO PROVIDE FORMAL MACHINERY FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHED AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD TO ADVISE THE DIRECTOR. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THIS BOARD ARE THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE (COL. EDDY), THE HEAD OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (MAJ. GEN. CHAMBERLIN), THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (REAR ADM. INGLIS), AND THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF-2 (MAJ. GEN. McDONALD). PROVISION IS MADE, HOWEVER, TO

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INVITE THE HEADS OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO SIT AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD ON ALL MATTERS BEING DISCUSSED WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR AGENCIES. AS A MATTER OF FACT ONE MEMBER FREQUENTLY ASKED TO SIT, IS MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER, THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD HAS PROVEN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TO ITS MEMBERS AND THE DIRECTOR, FOR IT SERVES AS A TWO-WAY STREET. ON THE ONE HAND, IT SERVES TO FURNISH THE DIRECTOR WITH THE BENEFITS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ADVICE, EXPERIENCE, AND VIEWPOINTS OF THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, EACH MEMBER OF THE BOARD RECEIVES THE BENEFITS OF THE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE OF THE DIRECTOR, BASED UPON THE BROADER, OVER-ALL NATIONAL VIEWPOINT OF C. I. G.

ONE FINAL THOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE--IT INCLUDES AN EXPRESS PROVISION THAT UNDER ITS TERMS NO POLICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS SHALL BE EXERCISED. NOR IS CIG AUTHORIZED TO MAKE OTHER THAN PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS WITHIN

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THE CONTINENTAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS. THESE PROVISIONS ARE IMPORTANT, FOR THEY DRAW THE LINES VERY SHARPLY BETWEEN CIG AND THE FBI. IN ADDITION, THE PROHIBITION AGAINST POLICE POWERS OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS IS AN ANSWER TO THOSE CITIZENS WHO LOOK UPON ALL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS OURS AS AN INCIPIENT GESTAPO.

HAVING DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL WAY, IN THE PRECEDING REMARKS, THE BASIC CHARTER OF OUR ORGANIZATION, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU NOW, IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL, OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE OPERATE AND TO TALK TO YOU QUITE FRANKLY OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACE.

UPON THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S DIRECTIVE IN JANUARY, THE NIA WAS ESTABLISHED, AND REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY SOUERS BECAME THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. HE IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED A PLANNING STAFF TO FORMULATE PLANS IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE. IN ADDITION, A CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF WAS SET UP CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION OF A DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND A VERY HIGHLY RESTRICTED GROUP OF OFFICIALS OF THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY.

DEPARTMENTS. THIS TOP SECRET SUMMARY FURNISHES THE PRESIDENT WITH A DAILY SYNOPSIS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE FROM ABROAD. TO THIS WAS SOON ADDED A WEEKLY REPORT DESIGNED TO EVALUATE OCCURRENCES ABROAD IN RELATION TO OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SPECIAL ESTIMATES, ISSUED FREQUENTLY, ON SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. FEELING HIS WAY CAREFULLY, ADMIRAL SOUERS GRADUALLY IMPLEMENTED HIS STAFF PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS, AS WELL AS PUTTING TOGETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF TO HANDLE PERSONNEL, SECURITY, AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

IN A FINAL REPORT TO THE NIA EARLY IN JUNE 1946, ADM. SOUERS STATED THAT THE INITIAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND PLANNING PHASE OF CIG ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN COMPLETED. HE URGED THAT THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS OF CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY CIG AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. WITH THE SUBMISSION OF THIS REPORT, ADM. SOUERS CONCLUDED HIS PERIOD AS DIRECTOR AND RETIRED.

IN MOVING INTO THE SECOND PHASE OF ITS EXISTENCE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO REORGANIZE CIG, AND THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. AN EXECUTIVE

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STAFF WAS ESTABLISHED, UNDER AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WHO SERVES SOMEWHAT IN THE CAPACITY OF A CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE DIRECTOR. IT INCLUDES THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS, MUCH IN THE MANNER OF AN A-1 AND A-4, AS WELL AS CERTAIN SPECIAL STAFF FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS BUDGET, LEGISLATIVE, LEGAL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SECURITY. IT CONTROLS, COORDINATES, AND SUPERVISES THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATING OFFICES.

AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF WAS ALSO ESTABLISHED. THIS STAFF IS THE AGENCY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHARGED WITH PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS. IT IS STAFFED WITH INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS OF LONG EXPERIENCE PERSONALLY SELECTED BY THE CHIEFS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS FURNISHING SUCH PERSONNEL. THIS STAFF IS THE REAL A-3 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND COORDINATES ITS WORK CLOSELY WITH THE EXECUTIVE STAFF. IN GENERAL ITS FUNCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. ACTS FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN COORDINATION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY, AND IN THE PREPARATION

OF RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OVER-ALL POLICIES AND PLANS TO ASSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION.

B. MAINTAINS CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. IT DIRECTS ITS ATTENTION ON THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE, WAR, NAVY, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED TO ASSURE THAT:

A. THE FACILITIES OF EACH GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY ARE ADEQUATE TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES;

B. ALL APPROPRIATE FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE ENDEAVOR ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED;

C. THE FACILITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP ARE OPERATING TO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE SERVICE TO THE STATE, WAR, NAVY, AND OTHER

GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND  
INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED;

D. RAW INFORMATION FROM ALL  
SOURCES AND ACTIVITIES IS RECEIVED  
BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, PROMPTLY  
DISTRIBUTED TO THE STATE, WAR, NAVY,  
AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS  
AND INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED;

E. THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIRE-  
MENTS OF THE STATE, WAR, NAVY, AND  
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND  
INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED ARE ADEQUATELY  
MET;

F. METHODS, PROCEDURES AND  
CONTROLS ARE ADEQUATE WITHIN THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE  
STATE, WAR, NAVY, AND OTHER GOVERN-  
MENTAL DEPARTMENTS FOR THE EXPEDI-  
TIOUS COLLECTION AND INTEGRATED  
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION OF INFORMA-  
TION -- AND FOR THE PROMPT DISSEMIN-  
ATION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL  
POLICY INTELLIGENCE.

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THE REAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION OF CIG IS EXERCISED BY THE DIRECTOR THROUGH FIVE (5) ASSISTANT DIRECTORS IN CHARGE OF AN OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION, AN OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES, AN OFFICE OF SECURITY, AN OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, AND AN OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

IN GENERAL THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION:

1. ACTS FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE AS IT AFFECTS THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
2. IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE COLLECTION AGENCIES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS, DETERMINES THE MEANS AND METHODS MOST APPROPRIATE FOR OBTAINING AND DISSEMINATING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO THE PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE.

THE ASSESSMENT-DIRECTION-OF-THE-DEEICE-OF  
REPORTS-AND-ESTIMATES:

ESTABLISHES REQUIREMENTS FOR  
AND PRODUCES STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL  
POLICY INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY FOR USE AS REQUIRED BY THE VAR-  
IOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE ASSESSMENT-DIRECTION-OF-THE-DEEICE-OF  
SECURITY:

FORMULATES AND PROMULGATES  
INTEGRATED SECURITY POLICIES AND  
PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO THE SAFEGUARDING  
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AS IT AFFECTS  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY, TO INCLUDE PLANS  
RELATING TO FUTURE CENSORSHIP REQUIRE-  
MENTS. PRESCRIBES OVER-ALL SECURITY  
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ENTIRE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

THE ASSESSMENT-DIRECTION-OF-THE-DEEICE-OF  
OPERATIONS:

COORDINATES THE AGENCIES OF  
CIG ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS APPROVED BY THE  
NIA FOR THE OVERT COLLECTION OF INFORMA-  
TION REQUIRED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF

INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF SERVICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ESTABLISHES AND EXECUTES THE ACTUAL CIG OPERATIONS IN THE FOREIGN FIELD.

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE CIG ORGANIZATION AS OUTLINED DIFFERS SOMEWHAT IN TERMINOLOGY FROM THE NAVY, STATE, AND WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. THE SCHEME ADOPTED IS THAT GENERALLY PRESCRIBED FOR THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, NAMELY: THE OFFICE, THE BRANCH, THE DIVISION, THE SECTION AND FINALLY THE UNIT. CIVIL SERVICE CONSIDERATIONS DICTATED THIS NOMENCLATURE AND THAT PRINCIPALLY ACCOUNTS FOR ITS ADOPTION.

CIG HAS INITIATED SEVERAL PLANS FOR COORDINATED OR CENTRALIZED ACTIVITIES SOME OF WHICH I WILL TOUCH ON BRIEFLY AS EXAMPLES. ONE OF THESE LIES IN THE FIELD OF BIOGRAPHIC

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INTELLIGENCE. THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS OTHER AGENCIES, EACH MAINTAINS A BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH CONTAINS THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON FOREIGN PERSONNEL. MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION <sup>25X1</sup> OVERLAPS INTO MANY FIELDS. FOR INSTANCE,

THE SERVICES AND OTHER AGENCIES ARE INTERESTED IN THE SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN SCIENTISTS. IN THESE DUPLICATING CASES, IT SEEMS UNNECESSARY FOR AN AGENCY TO HAVE TO CHECK THE FILES OF SEVERAL OTHER AGENCIES, IN ORDER TO ENSURE COMPLETE BIOGRAPHIC COVERAGE ON A GIVEN PERSON. THEREFORE, PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPORTING BIOGRAPHIC DATA, PRODUCING BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE, AND MAINTAINING SUPPORTING FILES ARE ALLOCATED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE CASE OF POLITICAL, CULTURAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITIES; TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE CASE OF MILITARY, ARMY, ARMY AIR, AND SEPARATE AIR FORCE PERSONALITIES; TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

FOR NAVY, NAVAL AIR AND FLEET AIR ARMS; AND TO EACH AGENCY AS JOINTLY AGREED OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING FOR SCIENTIFIC PERSONALITIES. PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR COORDINATION AT FOREIGN POSTS. COMPLETE CENTRAL FILES WILL BE MAINTAIN AT CIG, AS WELL, TO AVOID THE NECESSITY OF CHECKING SEVERAL AGENCIES. WE WILL ALSO TAKE STEPS TO CENTRALIZE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FROM AGENCIES OTHER THAN THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS, AND ASCERTAIN THE GAPS IN COVERAGE OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE WITH AN EYE TO FILLING THOSE GAPS. <sup>25X1</sup>

PLANS HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT FOR THE COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. WHILE THE PRIMARY BURDEN IN THIS CONNECTION WILL FALL ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFORMATION WILL BE COORDINATED BY CIG.

YOU WILL RECOLLECT THAT I SPOKE EARLIER OF THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED TO OPERATE THOSE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN WHICH CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY. SUCH A FUNCTION IS THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS BY THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THIS FUNCTION FORMERLY WAS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. WITH THE END OF THE WAR, THE COMMISSION FELT THAT IT COULD NO LONGER CONTINUE THIS FUNCTION. IT WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT, BUT THE PRIMARY USER OF THE INFORMATION WAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHICH WAS ALSO UNABLE TO ASSUME THE FUNCTION, LARGELY DUE TO BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS. THEREFORE, AS EVERYONE AGREED THAT THIS SERVICE SHOULD BE CONTINUED, AND, AS SEVERAL AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BENEFITED BY IT, IT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO US AT CIG FOR OPERATION. ITS PRODUCT IS DISSEMINATED BY US TO THOSE AGENCIES HAVING NEED FOR THIS MATERIAL.

SIMILARLY, THE WASHINGTON DOCUMENT CENTER WAS A JOINT SERVICE VENTURE FOR THE TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. THIS TOO HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CIG FOR CONTINUED EXPLOITATION.

PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE ACQUISITION ABROAD OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS BY A COMMITTEE UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS. THESE VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE TOOLS ARE GREATLY NEEDED, AND CIG DEVELOPED THE COORDINATED PLAN FOR THIS VENTURE. PLANS FOR A POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE SOVIET UNION IS A RECENT PROJECT ON THE AGENDA.

THUS YOU CAN SEE THAT THE COORDINATION OF MANY OF THE LOOSE ENDS HAS BEGUN, AND WE ARE PLANNING FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF MANY FORMS AND TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE NEVER CONSIDERED BEFORE THE WAR. MANY OF THESE WILL HAVE TO BE PERFORMED CENTRALLY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT CUTS AND SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL IN THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS, AND BECAUSE EFFICIENCY AND

ECONOMY OF OPERATION WILL DICTATE THE CENTRALIZATION OF MANY OF THESE FUNCTIONS WITHIN CIG.

PERHAPS THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION WHICH CIG CAN MAKE WILL LIE IN THE FIELD OF THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. IF THE PRESIDENT DESIRED AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE OF A GIVEN SITUATION, PREVIOUSLY HE WOULD HAVE TO CALL UPON THE WAR DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD FURNISH HIM WITH THE MILITARY AND AIR PICTURE, THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD PRESENT THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE NAVAL POTENTIALITIES AND CAPABILITIES, AND ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH WOULD COVER THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGICAL PICTURE. BUT NOWHERE WOULD THERE BE AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. EACH DEPARTMENT WOULD, OF NECESSITY, PRESENT AN ESTIMATE SLANTED TO ITS OWN PARTICULAR FIELD. NOW IT FALLS TO CIG TO PRESENT THIS OVER-ALL PICTURE IN A BALANCED ESTIMATE, INCLUDING THE PERTINENT MILITARY, AIR, NAVAL, AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DATA. FROM THIS THE PRESIDENT AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES. AND IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY BORNE IN MIND THAT CIG DOES NOT MAKE POLICY. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT

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THE INTELLIGENCE WHICH WE SUPPLY WILL BE THE ACCEPTED BASIS ON WHICH UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE FORMULATED IN THE INTEREST OF OUR DEFENSE AND SECURITY. NOTHING COULD BE MORE FATAL, HOWEVER, THAN TO HAVE CIG BE EVEN REMOTELY CONSIDERED AS A POLICY-MAKING BODY. NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH.

I AM FRANK TO ADMIT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES IN PERFECTING OUR ORGANIZATION DUE TO THE FACT THAT UNTIL VERY RECENTLY WE HAD TO DEPEND UPON THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS FOR PERSONNEL. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE INITIALLY IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE ALLOCATED FUNDS FROM THREE SEPARATE DEPARTMENTS--STATE, WAR, AND NAVY. CIG HAS DEVELOPED TO A POINT WHERE IT SEEKS ENTIRELY FEASIBLE TO SET IT UP ON ITS OWN FEET, AND LEGITIMIZE IT BY GIVING IT LEGISLATIVE PARENTS. THE LEGISLATION PROPOSED AT THE LAST SESSION OF THE CONGRESS FOR UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES INCLUDED A SECTION ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. IF NO UNIFICATION MEASURE IS ADOPTED BY THE NEXT CONGRESS, I FEEL THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN BY MEANS OF SEPARATE LEGISLATION TO FIRMLY ESTABLISH AN AGENCY TO CARRY ON THE FUNCTIONS I HAVE OUTLINED.

I TOLD YOU EARLIER THAT I WOULD DISCUSS SOME OF OUR MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS. I HAVE

ALREADY MENTIONED THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN AN ORGANIZATION WHOSE PERSONNEL AND THE FUNDS FOR WHICH MUST COME FROM MANY SOURCES. I FEEL THAT CIG SHOULD HAVE ITS OWN BUDGET. I HAVE ALSO BEEN FRANK TO URGE AND TO CONTEND THAT THAT BUDGET SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC. KNOWLEDGE OF ITS TOTAL FIGURE SHOULD BE HELD TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. IT WOULD BE COMPARATIVELY SIMPLE FOR ANY GOOD INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF ANY FOREIGN POWER TO MAKE A FAIRLY ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONS IF THEY WERE TO KNOW OUR BUDGET FIGURES OR OUR PERSONNEL CEILINGS. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONGRESS WILL GO ALONG WITH US IN TAKING EVERY STEP TO KEEP THESE FIGURES AN ABSOLUTE SECRET.

WHILE ON THE SUBJECT OF SECRECY, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ONE OF OUR GREATEST DIFFICULTIES WHICH IS SECURITY. THE ESPIONAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE PERHAPS ADEQUATE TO COVER THE FLAGRANT CASE OF SOMEONE WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, BREAKS INTO A BAR DEPARTMENT SAFE TAKES OUT A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT, AND IS CAUGHT RED-HANDED SELLING THE DOCUMENT TO A FOREIGN AGENT, BUT THE ESPIONAGE LAW IN ITS MOST IMPORTANT PENAL SECTION REQUIRES THE TEST OF KNOWLEDGE, THE

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TEST THAT THE VIOLATOR PERFORMED HIS ACT WITH  
INTEND TO INJURE THE UNITED STATES, OR WITH  
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD AID A FOREIGN  
NATION. IT HAS PROVEN VERY DIFFICULT IN MANY  
CASES TO PROVE THE NECESSARY INTEND REQUIRED  
BY THE LAW. IT IS EQUALLY DIFFICULT IN SOME  
CASES TO PROVE THAT THE ACT WAS PERFORMED WITH  
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD AID A FOREIGN  
NATION. TO PROVE A MAN'S INTENT HAS ALWAYS  
BEEN DIFFICULT.

CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT  
PROVIDE PENALTIES FOR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF  
ITS PROVISIONS. THERE AGAIN THE MERE NECESSITY  
OF PROVING A WILLFUL VIOLATION INVOLVES SOME  
ELEMENT OF PROOF OF INTENT FOR THE WORD  
"WILLFUL" ITSELF MEANS THAT THE VIOLATOR HAD  
AN INTENT. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A LAW WHICH  
DEFINES THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECURITY IN  
TERMS OF ITSELF WITHOUT REFERENCE TO INTENT.  
FOR EXAMPLE, IN MANY STATES THE POSSESSION OF  
FIREARMS IS ILLEGAL. THERE IS NO NEED TO SHOW  
INTENT IN THESE CASES; POSSESSION OF THE FIRE-  
ARMS IS SUFFICIENT. ONE REMEMBERS THE  
PROHIBITION ACT. POSSESSION OF LIQUOR WAS

ILLEGAL. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SHOW INTENT TO DRINK IT; POSSESSION WAS THE CRIME. AND SO A SIMPLE LAW WHICH WOULD MAKE IT A SEVERELY PUNISHABLE CRIME FOR AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON TO POSSESS CLASSIFIED DATA OR TO PUBLISH IT, OR TO TALK ABOUT IT, IS WHAT IS URGENTLY REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY.

QUITE RECENTLY, IN A FAMOUS CASE, SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF DOCUMENTS CLASSIFIED FROM "RESTRICTED" TO "TOP SECRET" TAKEN FROM THE FILES OF F. B. I. AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT, G-2, AND C. I. A., WERE FOUND IN A MAGAZINE OFFICE IN NEW YORK. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, THE GRAND JURY REFUSED TO BRING IN AN INDICTMENT UNDER THE ESPIONAGE LAWS.

IN A CASE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IT WAS FOUND IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD THE MEN WHO ATTEMPTED TO SELL SOME ATOMIC BOMB PICTURES TO A NEWSPAPER. ONLY THE PATRIOTISM OF THIS NEWSPAPER PREVENTED THEIR PUBLICATION.

WE MUST HAVE AN ACT SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO COVER SUCH A SITUATION. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS PARAMOUNT IN THIS COUNTRY, AND I WOULD BE THE LAST ONE TO INFRINGE UPON IT IN ANY MANNER,

28 **SECRET**

BUT I DO BELIEVE MOST SINCERELY THAT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS NOT SERVED WHEN A NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST PUBLISHES THE FULL TEXT OF A TOP SECRET CABLE COMPLETE WITH ITS CABLE NUMBER AND CLASSIFICATION, WHICH CAME FROM THE SECRET FILES OF A GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST BE CARRIED ON WITHOUT PUBLICITY. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY ARE WELL SERVED IF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST OPERATE IN A GOLDFISH BOWL.

ANOTHER PROBLEM WHICH MUST SOON BE SOLVED IS THE RELATIONSHIP TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN CIG AND THE NEWLY CREATED ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS COMMISSION, CREATED WITH IMMENSE POWERS, WILL NEED HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. IT WILL NEED TO KNOW THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND NUCLEAR PHYSICS. BECAUSE OF THE IMMENSE SECRECY SURROUNDING THIS TYPE OF WORK THIS WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT. THE COMMISSION WILL WANT TO KNOW THE LOCATION OF RAW FISSIONABLE MATERIALS ABROAD, AND THE LOCATION OF

PLANTS AND MINES. IT IS MY HOPE THAT CIG WILL BE DESIGNATED AS THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

FINALLY, I WOULD TOUCH ON THE PROBLEM OF PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL. I STATED AT THE START OF MY SPEECH THAT I HOPE THAT THE DAY HAD PASSED WHEN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP. IT IS MY HOPE, AND I AM SURE THAT ADMIRAL INGLISH WILL BEAR ME OUT IN THIS, THAT WE HAVE REACHED A PERIOD WHEN THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT FOR A YOUNG OFFICER IN INTELLIGENCE WILL BE JUST AS GOOD AND JUST AS RAPID AS IN COMMAND OR TACTICAL POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES WHICH WE HAD DURING THE WAR. MANY OF THE COUNTRY'S FINEST CIVILIAN MINDS WERE IN INTELLIGENCE. THE MAJORITY OF THEM HAVE NOW GONE BACK TO THEIR CIVILIAN PURSUITS. IN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH MANY OF THEM HAVE RETURNED TO THE QUIET LIFE OF ACADEMIC CIRCLES AND TO PURSUE THE STUDIES FROM WHICH THE WAR TOOK THEM. WE ARE TAKING MANY STEPS TO SECURE SOME OF THESE SCHOLARS

30 **SECRET**

AGAIN, AND OUR TASK WILL BE MADE THE EASIER WHEN THEY ARE AFFORDED THE SECURITY OF AN AGENCY WHICH IS ESTABLISHED BY LEGISLATION. I HOPE THAT MANY OF YOU WHO ARE HERE PRESENT WILL COME TO REALIZE THAT INTELLIGENCE DUTY IS ONE OF THE GREATEST SERVICES A MILITARY MAN CAN PERFORM IN THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY.

I HOPE I HAVE GIVEN YOU A REASONABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF THE MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. TO SUM IT UP IN A FEW WORDS--WE HOPE TO GATHER, THROUGH OUR OWN MEANS AND THOSE OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, ALL THE RAW INFORMATION AVAILABLE. HAVING ALL THE AVAILABLE RAW INFORMATION WE HOPE TO EVALUATE IT FROM A NATIONAL VIEWPOINT AND DISSEMINATE IT AS FINISHED INTELLIGENCE FOR USE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT WE OBTAIN ONLY A PART OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION BECAUSE PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE IS A DANGEROUS THING.

IN CLOSING I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THIS POINT BY QUOTING FROM A HINDOO FABLE:

38 **SECRET**

A\_HINDOO\_EABLE

IT WAS SIX MEN OF INDOSTAN  
TO LEARNING MUCH INCLINED,  
WHO WENT TO SEE THE ELEPHANT  
THOUGH ALL OF THEM WERE BLIND,  
THAT EACH BY OBSERVATION  
MIGHT SATISFY HIS MIND.

THE FIRST APPROACHED THE ELEPHANT,  
AND HAPPENING TO FALL  
AGAINST HIS BROAD AND STURDY SIDE  
AT ONCE BEGAN TO BAWL;  
"GOD BLESS ME!" BUT THE ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A WALL."

THE SECOND, FEELING OF THE TUSK,  
CRYED, "HO! WHAT HAVE WE HERE  
SO ROUND AND SMOOTH AND SHARP?  
TO ME 'TIS MIGHTY CLEAR  
THIS WONDER OF AN ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A SPEAR."

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THE THIRD APPROACHED THE ANIMAL,  
AND HAPPENING TO TAKE  
THE SQUIRMING TRUNK WITHIN HIS HANDS,  
THUS BOLDLY UP AND SPOKE:  
"I SEE," QUOTH HE, "THE ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A SNAKE!"

THE FOURTH REACHED OUT AN EAGER HAND,  
AND FELT ABOUT THE KNEE,  
"WHAT MOST THIS WONDROUS BEAST IS LIKE  
IS MIGHTY PLAIN, QUOTH HE;  
"TIS CLEAR ENOUGH THE ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A TREE!"

THE FIFTH WHO CHANCED TO TOUCH THE EAR  
SAID: "E'EN THE BLINDEST MAN  
CAN TELL WHAT THIS RESEMBLES MOST;  
DENY THE FACT WHO CAN,  
THIS MARVEL OF AN ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A FAN!"

THE SIXTH NO SOONER HAD BEGUN  
ABOUT THE BEAST TO GROPE,  
THAN, SEIZING ON THE SWINGING TAIL  
THAT FELL WITHIN HIS SCOPE,  
"I SEE," QUOTH HE, "THE ELEPHANT  
IS VERY LIKE A ROPE."

AND SO THESE MEN OF INDOSTAN  
DISPUTED LOUD AND LONG,  
EACH IN HIS OWN OPINION  
EXCEEDING STIFF AND STRONG  
THOUGH EACH WAS PARTLY IN THE RIGHT  
AND ALL WERE IN THE WRONG!

MORAL

SO OFT IN THEOLOGICAL WARS,  
THE DISPUTANTS, I WEEN  
RAIL ON IN UTTER IGNORANCE,  
OF WHAT EACH OTHER MEAN,  
AND PRATE ABOUT AN ELEPHANT  
NOT ONE OF THEM HAS SEEN!

GENTLEMEN, IN THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE WE MUST BE SURE THAT WE SEE THE  
COMPLETE ELEPHANT--AND NOT BECOME CONFUSED BY  
ITS MANY FEATURES. THAT IS THE JOB OF THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.